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Introduction 
In 1982, the U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, a Federal law that established 
U.S. policy for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 
Congress amended the Act in 1987, directing the Department of Energy to study only Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada as the site for a permanent geologic repository. As the law mandated, the 
Department evaluated Yucca Mountain to determine its suitability as the site for a permanent 
geologic repository. Decades of scientific studies demonstrated that Yucca Mountain would 
protect workers, the public, and the environment during the time that a repository would be 
operating and for tens of thousands of years after closure of the repository. A repository at this 
remote site would also: preserve the quality of the environment; allow the environmental 
cleanup of Cold War weapons facilities; provide the nation with additional protection from acts 
of terrorism; and support a sound energy policy. Throughout the scientific evaluation of Yucca 
Mountain, there has been no evidence to disqualify Yucca Mountain as a suitable site for the 
permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 
Upon completion of site characterization, the Secretary of Energy considered the results and 
concluded that a repository at Yucca Mountain would perform in a manner that protects public 
health and safety. The Secretary recommended the site to the President in February 2002; the 
President agreed and recommended to Congress that the site be approved. The Governor of 
Nevada submitted a notice of disapproval, and both houses of Congress acted to override the 
disapproval. In July 2002, the President's approval allowed the Department to begin the process 
of submittal of a license application for Yucca Mountain as the site for the nation's first 
repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 
Yucca Mountain is located on federal land in Nye County in southern Nevada, an arid region of 
the United States, approximately 100 miles (160 kilometers) northwest of Las Vegas (Figure 1). 
The location is remote from population centers, and there are no permanent residents within 
approximately 14 miles (23 krn) of the site. Overall, Nye County has a population density of 
about two persons per square mile (two persons per 2.5 square km); in the vicinity of Yucca 
Mountain, it is significantly less. 
Yucca Mountain is a series of north-south-trending ridges extending approximately 25 miles (40 
km), and consists of successive layers of fine-grained volcanic tuffs, millions of years old, 
underlain by older carbonate rocks. The alternating layers of welded and nonwelded volcanic 
tuffs have differing hydrologic properties that significantly impact the manner in which water 
moves through the mountain. The repository horizon will be in welded tuff located in the 
unsaturated zone, more than 1,000 feet (300 meters) above the water table in the present-day 
climate, and is expected to remain well above the water table during wetter future climate 
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conditions. Future meteorology and climatology at Yucca Mountain are important elements in 
understanding the amount of water available to potentially interact with the waste. 
Surface Facilities 
The surface facilities support the operations necessary to receive, stage, age, package, and 
support emplacement of waste. Figure 2 illustrates three types of Waste Handling Facilities, 
namely, the Fuel Handling Facility (FHF), the Canister Handling Facility (CHF), and the two 
Dry Transfer Facilities (DTF), as well as process support facilities. 
Inside each Waste Handling Facility, operations will be performed remotely from shielded 
galleries. Operators will use closed-circuit television or direct observation through shielded 
windows to control manual and power manipulators, overhead bridge cranes, Spent Nuclear Fuel 
(SNF) transfer or handling machines, and other remote equipment to perform SNF and High 
Level Waste (HLW) handling functions. Thick, reinforced concrete walls will shield workers 
from exposure to radiation and radioactive material. 
The Fuel Handling Facility will be the initial facility in operation to receive waste. SNF and 
HLW contained within the transportation casks will be transferred into waste packages for 
subsurface emplacement or transferred into site-specific casks for movement to an aging pad. 
The Fuel Handling Facility will be designed to receive a variety of waste forms, including 
uncanistered commercial SNF; canistered commercial SNF; canistered naval SNF; canistered 
HLW; and canistered Department of Energy SNF. 
Sealed canisters containing SNF or HLW will be transferred from transportation casks to waste 
packages in the Canister Handling Facility for emplacement underground or to site-specific casks 
for aging or staging, if needed. The facility will be designed to handle only waste contained in 
sealed canisters, typically HLW canisters, Department of Energy SNF canisters, naval SNF 
canisters, and canisters containing commercial SNF. 
The transfer of SNF and HLW from transportation casks to waste packages or to site-specific 
casks eventually will be accomplished in two Dry Transfer Facilities. The Dry Transfer 
Facilities also handle off-normal, damaged and nonstandard fuel, damaged transportation casks 
and damaged waste packages. Both Dry Transfer Facilities provide space, layout, structures, and 
systems that support waste handling and remediation operations. 
SNF'will be aged if emplacement must be delayed because of thermal management 
considerations, including blending to meet waste package thermal limits. Loaded site-specific 
casks will be moved to concrete aging pads and later retrieved so that their contents may be 
transferred into waste packages. Space will be provided for initial and future aging capability. 
Subsurface Facilities 
The repository subsurface components include the facilities necessary to transport and emplace 
waste packages. These subsurface facilities include excavated drifts, rail lines, emplacement 
pallets, engineered inverts, and support systems. The emplacement drifts will be large circular 
tunnels, nominally 18 feet (5  meters) in diameter, used to provide emplacement for about 11,000 
waste packages. The total subsurface emplacement area required to accommodate the waste 
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packages containing 70,000 metric tons' will be about 1,250 acres (500 hectares). This area will 
include more than 40 miles (26 km) of emplacement drifts excavated by tunnel boring machines. 
Ground support will be installed behind the tunnel boring machines to provide structural support 
and worker protection. The emplacement drift inverts will consist of engineered steel structures 
and granular fill materials at the base of the emplacement drifts. The inverts will support the 
pallets, waste packages, drift rail system, and drip shields. The granular material will slow the 
movement of radionuclides into the host rock in the event that a waste package is breached. 
The waste package consists of two concentric cylinders into which the waste forms will be 
placed. The inner cylinder will be made of stainless steel. The outer cylinder will be made of a 
corrosion-resistant nickel-based alloy. The closure end of the waste package has three lids that 
provide a leak-tight closure. The basic waste package design is the same for all waste forms; 
however, the sizes and internal waste package configurations will vary to accommodate the 
different waste forms. Before the inner vessel is sealed, air and vapor will be evacuated, and 
helium added as a fill gas. A pallet in the emplacement drift will structurally support the waste 
package. Emplacement pallets will be fabricated from the same materials as the waste packages, 
and will themselves be supported by the emplacement drift invert. 
After a decision to close the repository is made and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, titanium drip shields will be installed to protect waste packages from potentially 
dripping water and rockfall. 
Underground Development 
Portions of the subsurface facility have already been constructed during the site characterization 
phase. These existing facilities will be upgraded to support the construction of the repository or 
to become integral parts of the repository. The majority of the subsurface facility will be 
excavated using tunnel-boring machines. Repository emplacement and development activities 
will occur concurrently; the separate areas will have separate ventilation systems. A pressure 
differential will ensure that any releases of airborne radioactivity will be confined to the 
emplacement side of the repository. The underground layout avoids areas of more fractured rock 
in the south and restricts emplacement to the north to avoid an area where groundwater levels 
rise at a steeper gradient. 
The layout for the emplacenient drifts is based on a phased approach to development that 
supports the start of waste emplacement after a period of initial construction. Concurrent 
construction and emplacement will continue for a period of about 24 years. The subsurface 
layout is designed to be constructed in a four-panel sequence (Figure 3) The initial emplacement 
panel will be located within the central section of the overall layout and uses the existing, 
Exploratory Studies Facility and the north ramp for access to the repository horizon. The size of 
the panel is small in comparison to the other panels, and will be developed and commissioned as 
soon as possible after construction authorization. The general excavation process of a panel will 
begin with the excavation of the access and exhaust mains followed by the excavation of the 
ventilation shafts, and finally the turnouts and emplacement drifts. As the emplacement drifts 
' The Nuclear Waste Policy Act prohibits the emplacement of more than 70,000 metric tons until a second 
repository is licensed. Congress stopped work on the second repository program when it amended the Act in 1987, 
and directed the Secretary to report to the President and Congress on the need for a second repository. 
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within a panel become available to accept waste, the emplacement drifts will be isolated from the 
ongoing development construction by installing isolation barriers. 
I Operations Period Safety Analysis 
The operational period is anticipated to last for approximately 24 to 50 years, during which 
wastes will be received at the site and transferred into waste packages that are transported 
underground and emplaced. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that the waste be able 
to be retrieved from the repository beginning at any time up to 50 years after emplacement 
begins. 
I Assessment of preclosure safety involves identification of essential safety functions needed to assure the health and safety of workers and the public; identification of structures, systems, and components that will be used to implement these essential safety functions; and design criteria employed to achieve high reliability and defense in depth. Safety will be assured if the repository systems prevent the dispersal of unacceptable quantities of radioactive source materials, and prevent excessive radiation doses to workers and the general public. A combination of essential safety functions, including the integrity of radioactive sources, containment and confinement, and filtration will be used to assure safety. 
Shielding integrity will be provided by assuring that shield walls and other components remain 
intact during external initiating events, and also that moveable openings and doorways are 
interlocked to prevent opening when significant source terms are present on the other side of the 
moveable shield. Radioactive source term integrity will be provided by assuring that event 
sequences, which could breach canister or SNF cladding barriers, have been considered and 
applicable design criteria applied. Confinement integrity requires a combination of assuring, via 
design and procedural controls, implemented in accordance with applicable design criteria, that 
the integrity of the preferential airflow paths to the HEPA filters is maintained. This involves 
assuring structural integrity against external event sequence impacts, and that all vital support 
systems required to keep air flow through the HEPA filters are provided. 
External and internal hazard analyses show that considering all relevant event sequences and 
their consequences, the Yucca Mountain repository operations facilities can be designed, 
constructed and operated to ensure that the safety and health of the public and repository workers 
will be protected. 
The Long Term Safety of a Repository at Yucca Mountain 
The safety of a repository at Yucca Mountain will be assured by the performance of the natural 
and engineered features of the site, acting in concert, to prevent or delay the transport of 
radioactive materials to where the public could eventually be exposed to them. The Yucca 
Mountain repository system has three barriers that are relied upon to isolate radioactive wastes: 
the Upper Natural Barrier, the Engineered Barrier System, and the Lower Natural Barrier. 
Figure 4 is a schematic representation of the repository system highlighting the three barriers. 
The Yucca Mountain site's geologic and hydrologic characteristics form effective natural 
barriers to the flow of water and to the potential movement of radionuclides. The underground 
environment within the natural setting is conducive to the design and construction of components 
that prevent or reduce the movement of water or the potential release and transport of 
Page 4 o f  9 3/14/2005 
radionuclides. The waste isolation capability of the natural setting is a function of the favorable 
characteristics of the geologic units. The capability of the Engineered Barrier System will be 
achieved by designing components to function in the natural setting of Yucca Mountain, 
particularly, its unsaturated rock units. The materials in the Engineered Barrier System have 
been chosen so that the components perform their intended functions for many thousands of 
years. Each of the barriers in the repository system works individually, and together, to limit the 
movement of water and the release and movement of radionuclides. 
Upper Natural Barrier 
Yucca Mountain is in a semiarid region where precipitation and humidity are low, thus 
promoting high evaporation rates. The area near Yucca Mountain also is characterized by great 
depth to the water table. In the vicinity of the repository, the depth of the water table is 
approximately 2,000 feet (600 meters) below the ground surface, allowing the repository itself to 
be located approximately 1,000 feet (300 meters) above the water table. The topography and 
surficial soils of Yucca Mountain provide the initial barrier feature that limits the movement of 
water into the mountain. Runoff, evaporation, and plant transpiration combine to divert water 
and permit only a small fraction of the already low expected precipitation at the site to infiltrate 
into the mountain. The climate and infiltration analyses for Yucca Mountain demonstrate that 
limited infiltration of water into Yucca Mountain is expected for present and future climates. 
Precipitation falling on Yucca Mountain is expected to remain low, even for the glacial-transition 
climates that are forecast for most of the next 10,000 years. 
The volcanic tuffs in the unsaturated zone above the repository horizon function to prevent or 
reduce the movement of water through the unsaturated zone and into the emplacement drifts of 
the repository. The tuffs divert percolating water, damp pulses of infiltration, and have capillary 
forces that limit seepage into the emplacement drift. Water flow within the nonwelded tuff unit 
is predominantly in the matrix, and the rock matrix has a large storage capacity. Only a small 
percentage of the water is expected to pass through fractures, because they are not well 
connected. The nonwelded tuff unit thus attenuates flow from the overlying welded unit. The 
welded tuff units that comprise the repository host rock have lower matrix porosity and higher 
fracture frequency than the overlying nonwelded tuff. Unsaturated flow in the welded units is 
expected to be primarily through the fractures. 
The rate and distribution of seepage into waste emplacement drifts control the amount of water 
available to contact the Engineered Barrier System. In the unsaturated zone, seepage into the 
emplacement drifts will be limited because of capillary forces that limit the movement of water 
into the drift openings. Water is likely to be retained in the small pores and tight fractures of the 
low-porosity welded tuff, and a substantial fraction of the flow is expected to move around the 
drift opening and drain through the rock pillars between the drifts. For a period of time, the 
decay heat of the emplaced waste will be great enough to heat the rock near the emplacement 
drifts, and the water will be driven away from the emplacement drift wall surfaces. 
Engineered Barrier System 
The Engineered Barrier System prevents or substantially reduces the release of radionuclides 
from the waste. Should the waste packages remain intact for tens of thousands of years as 
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I expected, none of the waste forms will be exposed to water and no release of radionuclides will 
occur 
The drip shield will be designed to divert any seepage away from the waste package. It will 
prevent water from contacting the waste package as long as it remains intact. Similarly, as long 
as the waste packages are intact, water cannot contact the waste forms. The Zircaloy cladding 
that encases much of the spent nuclear he1 also will prevent the contact of seepage water with 
the waste form as long as it remains intact. The corrosion rates for Titanium Grade 7 are 
expected to be sufficiently low such that none of the drip shields is expected to breach by these 
mechanisms before 10,000 years. Stress corrosion cracking may occur as a result of rockfall 
onto the drip shields. The general corrosion rates for Alloy 22 are sufficiently low so that none 
of the waste packages is expected to breach before 10,000 years. Stress corrosion cracking may 
occur in the weld regions of some of the waste packages. Mitigation techniques (e.g., laser 
peening) will be employed to reduce residual stresses below the stress corrosion cracking 
threshold, but there remains the potential for breaches of some waste packages before 10,000 
years. Early failure of some waste packages potentially may occur due to flaws that are 
undetected during fabrication or as a result of damage during handling. The probability for early 
failure in this case is likely to be small because of the quality control measures employed. 
In the unexpected event that waste packages are breached, the release rate of radionuclides will 
be limited by the characteristics of the Engineered Barrier System. The release of radionuclides 
will be first impeded by the rate of degradation of the waste form. Waste form degradation 
cannot begin until the waste package is breached, which allows air and moisture to enter. 
Because of the unsaturated environment, the elevated temperatures within waste packages, and 
the presence of drip shields and waste packages, the amount of water in contact with the waste 
form is expected to be limited to a thin film that could possibly adsorb on the waste form surface. 
Release can only occur if radionuclides are dissolved in water or attached to colloids, and if there 
are continuous liquid pathways in the waste package, including thin films of water. Advective 
transport of radionuclides out of the barrier can occur only if there is a liquid flux of water along 
these pathways and if breaches are sufficiently open to permit flow. The movement of many 
dissolved radionuclides, including those that are the greatest contributors to the total inventory, 
will be retarded by sorption on iron corrosion products within the waste package. The 
retardation depends on the volume of these corrosion products and on the distribution 
coefficients associated with them. Sorption onto the corrosion products also reduces movement 
of those radionuclides reversibly attached to colloids in the water. The radionuclide inventory 
released from the Engineered Barrier System after the waste package is breached will be limited 
so long as the drip shield remains intact, precluding advective flow out of the waste package and 
through the invert; in this case, the release will be purely diffusive. The release that could occur 
in the unlikely event the drip shield is breached, and does not divert seepage away from the 
waste package, will be greater than the purely diffusive case and depends on the failure 
characteristics of the waste package. Both diffusive and advective releases have been considered 
in the evaluation of radionuclide releases from the Engineered Barrier System. 
I Lower Natural Barrier 
Radionuclides that migrate down through the unsaturated zone to the water table are transported 
through the saturated zone before they can reach the accessible environment. Groundwater 
below Yucca Mountain is part of the Alkali Flat-Furnace Creek groundwater subbasin within the 
Death Valley groundwater system. Present-day flow is to the south and east near Yucca 
Mountain. This southeasterly flow from the site is incorporated into the stronger southward flow 
east of the Mountain. The saturated zone of the Lower Natural Barrier includes the fractured 
volcanic rocks fiom below the repository to approximately 7 to 9 miles (12 to 14 km) south of 
Yucca Mountain and the saturated alluvium to the accessible environment. The movement of 
radionuclides in the saturated zone will be slow because the velocity of water that can carry them 
is low, particularly in the alluvium. In addition, several processes cause the movement of 
I radionuclides to be slower compared to the rate of movement of the water. 
Flow in the volcanic aquifers will be predominantly in the fractures. Radionuclides can 
exchange between the fractures and matrix via matrix diffusion. This diffusive exchange results 
in a slower effective travel velocity for the bulk of the released radionuclides relative to water- 
flow velocities in the fractures for two reasons. First, the velocity of water in the pores of the 
matrix will be slower than velocities in the fractures. Second, sorption onto mineral surfaces in 
the matrix pores will result in even slower movement for those sorbing radionuclides that diffuse 
into the matrix materials. 
Because the alluvial materials are a porous medium, water flow and radionuclide transport occur 
in intergranular pores. The effective porosity of the alluvium is significantly greater than the 
fracture porosity of the tuffs. Consequently, pore velocities in the alluvium are expected to be 
smaller than those in the fractures of the volcanic aquifers. Although matrix diffusion is not 
considered important in the alluvium, radionuclide movement will be slow because of the low 
water velocity. In addition, sorption onto minerals in the alluvium results in retardation of the 
radionuclide movement relative to the water movement in these sediments. 
The Environmental Protection Agency Standard 
The Environmental Protection Agency standards for Yucca Mountain after permanent closure 
address all potential pathways of radiation exposure and limit an individual's annual radiation 
exposure from all pathways consistent with what the Environmental Protection Agency considers 
an acceptable risk to society for 10,000 years following closure. The Environmental Protection 
Agency also set a standard to protect the groundwater around Yucca Mountain. This standard 
sets specific limits for the concentration of different types of radioactive particles in the 
groundwater. Further, The Department must assess an inadvertent human intrusion into the 
repository at some time in the future. 
Three scenario classes are considered in the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) that 
is used to evaluate repository performance: the nominal scenario class, which includes 
consideration of potential early waste package failures; the igneous scenario class, which 
includes consideration of unlikely volcanic intrusion and eruption, both of which are low 
probability events; and the seismic scenario class, which includes consideration of waste package 
mechanical damage associated with a low probability seismic event and unlikely deliquescence- 
induced localized corrosion processes. The sum of the mean annual dose estimates for the 
individual scenario class modeling cases (i.e., the nominal and the disruptive scenario classes) 
provides an estimate of the mean annual dose for the total system. 
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Demonstration of the performance of the repository includes an assessment of the ability of the 
repository to limit radiological exposures to the reasonably maximally exposed individual for the 
period after permanent closure in the event of human intrusion into the Engineered Barrier 
System. The earliest time after disposal that the drip shields and waste package would have 
degraded sufficiently that a human intrusion could occur without recognition by the drillers 
would be well after 10,000 years. Because such a human intrusion without recognition is not 
projected to occur before 10,000 years after disposal, the results of the human intrusion analysis 
and its bases were included in the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement, as 
required. 
Demonstration of the performance of the repository also includes compliance with the separate 
groundwater protection standards. Radionuclide concentrations are calculated by summing the 
mass of radionuclides reaching the accessible environment in each year for all likely features, 
events, and processes and dividing that sum by the representative volume of water to calculate 
the annual radionuclide concentrations. 
Calculations performed to date indicate that a repository at the Yucca Mountain site will likely 
meet all of the Environmental Protection Agency requirements for 10,000 years following 
permanent closure. The standard also includes a requirement to assess the performance of the 
Yucca Mountain repository at time of peak dose. This evaluation has been done and the results 
were reported in the Environmental Impact Statement. However, since that time, a Federal Court 
has vacated that standard to the extent that it only required compliance for 10,000 years. The 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are currently 
assessing paths forward; their potential actions will have a bearing on the license application 
process. 
The License Application 
Before a repository can be constructed and operations can begin, the Department of Energy first 
must apply for and receive construction authorization from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
an independent agency of the federal government. This construction authorization must then be 
followed by an application for, and receipt of, a license to receive and possess waste. An 
amendment to the license will be needed to close the repository. The Department is in the 
process of preparing the license application. 
Although the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission are both federal 
entities, they operate as independent agencies, a relationship that is defined in the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974. This federal law assigns the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the 
responsibility of regulating the nation's civilian use of nuclear materials to ensure adequate 
protective measures are in place to protect the public and the environment. The Department of 
Energy was given the responsibility for promoting nuclear power and conducting other energy- 
related work, including the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. 
If the Department of Energy is approved to construct and operate a repository at Yucca 
Mountain, it will become a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee and be subject to their 
regulations in all phases of operation, including receipt and possession of nuclear materials, and 
transportation of nuclear materials to the repository site. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Location of Yucca Mountain and illustration of access to underground development, 
with details of emplacement drifts. 
Figure 2. Surface facility layout illustrating location and sequencing of processes for waste 
handling facilities. 
Figure 3. Illustration of layout of surface facilities and underground facility, with emplacement 
sequencing indicated. 
Figure 4. Schematic representation of the repository system highlighting the three barriers that 
are relied upon to isolate radioactive wastes: the Upper Natural Barrier, the Engineered Barrier 
System, and the Lower Natural Barrier. 
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